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On the Possible Foreign 
Policy of the Post-Putin 
Russia
The Case of Alexei Navalny’s 
Viewpoints on Foreign Affairs
Artem Patalakh
The study delves into the foreign policy plans of Alexei Navalny, the 
Russian politician who is currently commonly regarded as the most 
prominent opposition leader and the sole plausible alternative to Vla- 
dimir Putin. Drawing on his interviews, public speeches, media publi-
cations and electoral manifestos, the author analyses his foreign policy 
views alongside three topics, that is, Russia’s policies towards disput-
ed lands and states in the post-Soviet area (Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Transnistria), the country’s foreign policy orientation 
and priorities (especially regarding relations with the West) and assess-
ment of the Putin regime’s foreign policy. Following this, the author 
speculates on the likely foundations of Russia’s foreign policy under 
Navalny’s possible presidency and their implications for the West.
Keywords: Alexei Navalny, Crimea, Donbas war, Russian foreign policy, 
Russian opposition, Syrian civil war.
In recent years, among all Russian opposition politicians, Alexei Na-
valny, the leader of the Progress Party and the head of Anti-Corruption 
Foundation, has tended to be internationally considered as the most 
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influential and the only one who is potentially capable of defeating 
Vladimir Putin. Due to his notorious anti-corruption investigations 
aimed at Russia’s leading officials and politicians,1 well-organised coun-
trywide protests in March and June 20172 as well as relatively successful 
2013 Moscow mayoral and ongoing presidential campaigns, Navalny’s 
personality, views and tactics have received sizeable scholarly atten-
tion3 and coverage in the leading international media.4 Thrice included 
in Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers list5 and twice mentioned 
in Time’s annual roundups of the world’s most influential people in 
the Internet,6 nowadays Navalny frequently enjoys such pretentious 
descriptions as “Russia’s last opposition hero,”7 “Putin’s main political 
opponent,”8 “the man who would beat Putin,”9 “the leader of the oppo-
sition of Russia”10 and “most prominent opposition figure”11 who “has 
breathed new life into the opposition movement”12 and “caused a stir 
in Russian politics.”13 Of no less importance is that international politi-
cians also to some extent seem to recognise Navalny’s status as one of 
Russia’s key opinion leaders and fighters against Putin’s regime: to il-
lustrate, his anti-corruption investigations have been highly appreciat-
ed14 by Guy Verhofstadt, former Prime Minister of Belgium and current 
Member of the European Parliament and leader of the European ALDE 
Party. Besides, some analysts point to the fact that the list of Russians, 
on whom the US imposed sanctions for the annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014, by and large coincided with the list proposed by Navalny 
in his article in The New York Times one day earlier,15 hinting that the 
Obama administration may have taken account of his suggestions.16
Despite his notability and a heightened interest in his personali-
ty, Navalny’s political views, nevertheless, remain a rather debatable 
matter in Russian politics. Most of the above-cited international mag-
azines depict Navalny as a democratic, liberal politician determined 
to put an end to Putin’s authoritarianism, democratise the country 
and integrate it in the world community.17 Indeed, already now one 
may reasonably assume that should Navalny one day come to pow-
er, some of his policies will be extraordinary for contemporary Russia. 
For example, few would doubt that Navalny’s Russia will witness an 
unparalleled anti-corruption campaign, taking cognizance of his ac-
knowledgedly tough stance on corruption. Likewise, his readiness to 
legalise same-sex marriages18 can also be regarded as exceptional for 
someone who intends to run for presidency in a country where con-
servatism is presently on the rise19 and where there seems to be little 
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consensus on gay rights protection even among liberals.20 At the same 
time, Navalny himself prefers calling himself “just a normal candidate 
from normal people, who proposes a reasonable and logical program,” 
attempting to distance himself from being labelled as “liberal,” arguing 
that a strict association with liberalism would potentially allow him 
to count on solely about 3-4 percent of the votes while he wants to 
win the presidential elections.21 Incidentally, a great number of the 
country’s conspicuous liberal public figures tend to question Navalny’s 
commitment to democracy and liberalism, raising concerns about his 
arguably authoritarian leadership style, nationalistic views, willingness 
to attract jingoists22 etc.
Factoring in the great discrepancies regarding Navalny’s political 
ideas in general, it appears interesting to analyse his foreign policy 
beliefs in particular, all the more so because the existent academic 
research on his political views, first, mainly deals with his domestic 
rather than foreign policy ideas and second, is primarily dedicated to 
his 2013 mayoral campaign, failing to account for the changes that have 
occurred in both his views23 and Russian politics ever since. Further-
more, notwithstanding that his chances to win the presidential elec-
tions in March 2018 may seem minor given his still modest rating24 
and the fact that the Kremlin is placing numerous obstructions to his 
campaign,25 now that he has clearly declared his presidential ambitions 
and therefore, may succeed Putin as the one in charge with the coun-
try’s external affairs, his foreign policy program is of particularly great 
topicality. The analysis rests on Navalny’s numerous speeches, inter-
views, articles and electoral manifestos appeared in the period 2014-
17 and is clustered around three themes on which he chiefly concen-
trates, namely Russian policies toward disputed lands and states in the 
post-Soviet space (Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transn-
istria), the country’s general foreign policy orientation (in particular, as 
far as Russia-West relations are concerned) and assessment of Putin’s 
foreign policy.
Navalny’s Foreign Policy Views
Secessionist territories
Perhaps the primary thing that will be remembered about the Putin/
Medvedev regime’s foreign policy is the two military conflicts that Rus-
sia has waged in the former Soviet republics, namely the 2008 Rus-
so-Georgian war and particularly the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian war. Alexei 
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Navalny’s stand on them is peculiar in two ways. Firstly, he tends to 
pointedly stress their relative unimportance compared to Russia’s do-
mestic affairs. Even in 2014-15, when foreign policy issues (especially 
Crimea and Donbas) were significantly dominating the country’s pub-
lic discourse, Navalny’s focus was primarily on internal problems: in 
October 2014, for example, he posited that “the issue of illegal immi-
gration is 100 times more important than any Ukraine,” believing that 
“[i]t’s not in the interests of Russians to seize neighbouring republics, 
it’s in their interests to fight corruption, alcoholism and so on—to 
solve internal problems.”26 Secondly, Navalny usually does not seem to 
want to canvass foreign policy in general and Ukraine in particular, fre-
quently eschewing answering foreign affairs related questions as clear-
ly and knowledgeably as he normally does whenever asked on other 
topics (e.g. Russian ruling elite, elections, corruption, etc.), preferring 
giving vague replies and trying to drive the conversation towards in-
ternal issues instead. In this vein, in October 2014, Navalny’s response 
to the question whether he was considering Crimea as belonging 
to Russia or Ukraine was “Crimea belongs to the people who live in 
Crimea.”27 When in April 2017, Spiegel’s journalist raised the point of 
Navalny’s general avoidance of answering questions on foreign policy 
and Ukraine by giving replies of the kind “[m]y foreign policy consists 
of finally building roads and the payment of higher wages,” Navalny 
gave a reply which explicitly implied he was treating foreign affairs as 
a low salience issue:
I am not avoiding it [foreign policy]. But I believe, and in this 
sense I am different from Putin, that Russia should not iso-
late itself. Everything that happens in our country is justified 
through Syria or Ukraine. But when one’s own citizens only 
make 300 euros, one can’t have much clout in foreign policy. 
Let’s start with colonizing our own country. When I visit my 
brother in jail, I drive through the most densely populated part 
of European Russia—and I don’t see anybody, kilometer after 
kilometer. That would be a great opportunity to apply our en-
ergies.28
Albeit the cases of Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Transnistria are seemingly identical in that these territories’ break-
aways were possible only thanks to Russian military and financial as-
sistance and are not recognised by the international community, Na-
valny treats each of them differently. As for Crimea, he holds a “realist” 
13
On  the Possible 
Foreign Policy
of the Post-Putin
Russia
standpoint, arguing that “despite the fact that Crimea was seized with 
egregious violations of all international regulations, the reality is that 
Crimea is now part of Russia.”29 Expressing refusal to return Crimea 
back to Ukraine immediately—once he said the peninsula is not “some 
sort of sausage sandwich to be passed back and forth”30—and consid-
ering the status referendum held on the peninsula in March 2014 as 
falsified, Navalny has been a continual proponent of a new, “fair” ref-
erendum that would be conducted according to democratic standards 
with the presence of international observers and hence, would poten-
tially satisfy all the currently opposing sides, from Crimean Tatars to 
the EU.31 Yet, he does not seem optimistic about the peninsula’s fu-
ture, saying that try as he might, neither the international communi-
ty nor Ukraine are likely to recognise the referendum, so Crimea will 
most probably remain one of many unresolved territorial disputes in 
the world,32 suffering from a lack of investments and economic devel-
opment.33 Incidentally, Navalny’s idea of a fair referendum in Crimea 
is common among Russia’s democratic opposition: a similar view 
has been expressed by the former leader of the PARNAS party Boris 
Nemtsov, murdered in February 2015, and the leader of the “Yabloko” 
party Emilia Slabunova.34 Analogously to PARNAS and Yabloko during 
their 2016 parliamentary elections campaign,35 Navalny currently de-
cided not to open presidential campaign offices on the Crimean pen-
insula.36
As to Donbas, Navalny advocates implementing the Minsk Accords, 
i.e., granting amnesty to local separatists and discontinuing provi-
sion of material support to them, withdrawing the remaining Russian 
troops (that, in his opinion, are still remaining in East Ukraine) and 
restoring control of the state border to the government of Ukraine.37 
Yet, on this point, he seems to lack a strategic vision of what to do 
next and how the situation will evolve after; moreover, once elected 
president, he apparently wants to completely liberate himself as soon 
as possible from solving Donbas’ issues, putting them thoroughly on 
the Ukrainian government. To illustrate, consistently referring to the 
needed policies towards Ukraine as “easy,” meaning that the sole thing 
Russia needs to do is to implement the Minsk Accords, he, howev-
er, failed to give a compelling reply to the question how to deal with 
Ukraine that is not observing the Minsk Accords either, simply saying 
“I will implement the Russian part of the Minsk Accords, I will trans-
fer the border control.”38 Likewise, when faced the question of how to 
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stop Ukrainian nationalists who are likely to pose danger to Donbas’ 
citizens once the region is back in Ukraine, Navalny answered—quite 
jauntily—that “for this purpose, there are blue helmets, there are Eu-
ropean troops, units of various kinds, and mankind has a rather great 
experience in the application of such measures.”39 Finally, whenever 
asked about the ways to normalise Russo-Ukrainian relations, Navalny 
gives rather philosophical responses nearly absent of concrete political 
steps, arguing that Putin’s policies have created such a hostile state in 
the person of Ukraine that there can hardly be any universal decision 
to tackle the problem, that “it is only time that will mainly heal the 
wound” and, provided that Russia performs the Minsk Accords and no 
other conflicts flare up, “perhaps, in a couple of generations, we [Rus-
sians] will completely normalise our relations with Ukraine.”40 So far, 
incidentally, Navalny’s ideas on Ukraine appear to have faced opposi-
tion both from most of the Russian pro-Kremlin media and a great deal 
of the Ukrainian mainstream ones with the former portraying him as 
closely affiliated with Ukraine41 while the latter arguing that his possi-
ble presidency would imply little, if any, change in Moscow’s approach 
to Kiev.42
According to Navalny, comparing Crimea and Donbas to Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia and Transnistria is hardly accurate: while the latter three 
territories have been de facto independent since the break-up of the So-
viet Union and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war was, in his opinion, initiat-
ed by Georgia,43 Ukrainian secessionist regions came to existence in con-
sequence of Putin’s policies. Again, he does not appear to have a clear-
cut program on what to do with Abkhazia and South Ossetia: while he 
favours halting sponsoring them and is reluctant to return them back to 
Georgia, recently he admitted he is “not ready” to answer the question 
whether Russia should keep its military bases there.44 It remains, none-
theless, unclear how it may be possible—with no military and economic 
support—to retain the independence of the territories which, as Gerrits 
and Bader put it, are “dependent on Moscow to an extent that is rarely 
observed between states that recognise each other’s independence,” tak-
ing into account that “[t]he economic and intergovernmental linkages 
between Russia and the two regions are not just extraordinarily deep, 
but they directly undermine the autonomy of the regions.”45
Common in his treatment of all those secessionist territories is 
that he mostly considers them not from identity-related or geopolit-
ical, but from a purely economic perspective,46 as territories on the 
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maintenance of which Russian taxpayers’ money are being spent. In 
this vein, he supported the statement that Crimea is de-facto Russian 
on the grounds that pensions and salaries on the peninsula are paid 
from the Russian budget.47 When facing the question of how he will 
interact with Abkhazia and South Ossetia once elected president, the 
first thing he said was that the money Russian taxpayers are currently 
paying to those territories amounts to 200,000 roubles (about 2,900 
Euro) monthly per a local citizen, the practice which he wants to stop.48 
Analogously, his resoluteness to do away with the Donbas war also pri-
marily relates to economic issues: his main arguments in favour of the 
implementation of the Minsk Accords are that, given Russia’s own un-
derdeveloped social system and abject poverty, first, the country can-
not afford spending money on the war itself, the payment of salaries 
and pensions to locals and the sustenance of Ukrainian refugees and 
second, Russia needs international economic sanctions to be lifted.49 
Remarkably, for Navalny, the economic angle of the war in Donbas sig-
nificantly surpasses ethical and legal considerations. Exemplary of this 
point is that during his debates with Igor Strelkov, a Russian army vet-
eran who played a crucial role in the occupation of Crimea and organ-
isation of the militant groups of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s 
Republic in April-August 2014, Navalny evaded from calling him a war 
criminal, saying the it is not him, but the court that should decide it.50 
Instead, his main accusation of Strelkov was not that the war initiated 
by Strelkov has resulted in over 10,000 deaths thus far, but rather that 
the war is costly, is “destroying Russia’s economy” and “deprives Rus-
sian citizens . . . of their money, last money.”51
Foreign Policy Orientation and Russia-West Relations 
Unlike Putin, whose rhetoric tends to stress Russia’s distinctiveness 
both from the West and the East, Navalny does not seem to focus on 
this issue at all, sometimes, similarly to Putin, considering the country 
as being in “a unique position between Europe and Asia”52 and some-
times regarding Russia to be a part of the Western world.53 In general, 
in his speeches and manifestos, Navalny tends to abstain from spe-
cially highlighting the West in general or Europe in particular, sim-
ply listing them among several key players with which he is willing to 
build friendly relations.54 On a more careful reading of his manifestos, 
however, it becomes evident he still somewhat favours Western states 
among other actors, arguing that “Russia’s strategic interests in the 
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contemporary world in many respects coincide with the interests of 
developed Western countries . . . It is them with whom Russia will de-
velop equal partnership and alliances.”55 At the same time, for Navalny, 
Russia’s position in the world and the country’s relations with the West 
appear to be a pragmatic/rational rather than ideological/identity-re-
lated matter. While clearly rejecting Putin’s “third way” and “Eurasian-
ism” ideologies56 and refraining from depicting the West as the main 
hindrance to the development of Russian economy,57 as often does 
Russian official propaganda, Navalny nevertheless seems to accentu-
ate an economic, trade and political rather than ideological alliance 
with the West, overtly stating that he will build his policy towards all 
international actors, including Western countries, through the prism 
of “whether Russia benefits from this and . . . whether the Russian Fed-
eration’s citizens make more money on this.”58 In a similar manner, he 
considers Russia’s accession to WTO as right in that the country’s most 
economic sectors capitalise on it.59 According to Navalny, Russia and 
the West have common strategic interests, among which he lists free-
dom of trade, battle against international terrorism and reduction of 
international tensions.60 Notably, the Progress Party’s electoral man-
ifesto states that under its rule, “Russia will abandon supporting the 
regimes which rest on lie, violence and suppression of democracy” and 
“Russia will support post-Soviet states’ movement towards democracy 
and civil freedoms, avoiding gross political or military interferences in 
the affairs of the neighbouring states,”61 which may be interpreted as a 
sort of readiness to promote democracy and human rights abroad, but 
solely in a “passive” form which does not require any material expenses.
Remarkably, Navalny tends to understand international politics 
chiefly in realpolitik terms, as states’ constant struggle for their nation-
al interests. Almost identically to Putin’s statements, Navalny’s mani-
festos tend to underline that under his presidency, the country’s for-
eign policy would be independent62 and its cooperation with the EU—
equal.63 Pointing to the fact that the unity of the Western world, as 
commonly perceived from Russia, is in many respects exaggerated and 
in fact, EU member states compete with one another with each nation 
placing its own interests before those of the EU, Navalny believes that 
Western powers are generally interested in Russia playing the role of 
“hinterlands of resources” and hence, try to impede its technological 
advancement.64 Given this, it is no wonder that unlike the world’s most 
liberals, Navalny does not see any problem in cooperating with Donald 
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Trump or European far-right parties should they once come to power 
in their countries.65 Again, this point seems to reflect his general belief 
in the priority of objective national interests over ideological consid-
erations: supposing that a country’s foreign policy is in many aspects 
inertial and guided by economic interests independent of ideology, 
he did not believe in December 2016 that Russia’s relations with the 
US would change significantly under Trump.66 Yet, noteworthy is that 
Navalny tends to comment on Russia-West relations rather vaguely, 
negligently, which seems to indicate that he lacks a clear program on 
this issue. Consider, for example, the answer that he gave at a meeting 
with his supporters:
When I become President, what relations am I planning to 
build with the United States? Usual, normal ones. Well, Trump 
will come here, we’ll shake each other’s hands. Everyone wants 
one simple thing—that is earning money. And I want Russia 
in its relations with the USA to earn money as well, I want us 
[Russia and the US] to cooperate in the oil-and-gas sphere, in 
outer space and everywhere else.67
As for Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet area, the Progress Party’s 
manifesto mentions it only after Russia-West relations, which indi-
cates that Navalny hardly deems Russia’s so-called “near abroad” as a 
pillar of the country’s foreign policy—as distinct from Russia’s current 
Foreign Policy Concept which states that “[t]he foreign policy priorities 
of the Russian Federation include developing bilateral and multilat-
eral cooperation with member States of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) and further strengthening integration structures 
within the CIS involving Russia.”68 However, pointing to the “close cul-
tural and language ties” that the post-Soviet states have “for historical 
reasons,” Navalny does not reject the Eurasian integration completely, 
suggesting that it be continued, but only “to the extent that it will con-
tribute to the mutual benefit”69 of its participants rather than to the 
detriment of economic interests for geopolitical purposes. In general, 
Navalny appears to conceive of the post-Soviet space in terms of inter-
nal (security, economic) rather than foreign affairs: in this vein, guided 
by the desire to be able to control an inflow of migrants to Russia, he 
actively proposes to introduce a visa regime not only with Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, but even with Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, 
Russia’s fellows in the Eurasian Economic Union.70
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Atitude to Putin’s Foreign Policy
Navalny’s stance on Putin’s approach to foreign affairs is highly critical 
and one can distinguish three major lines of his criticism. The first—
and the main one—relates to Putin’s foreign policy being arguably 
injurious to Russia’s developmental needs. In this respect, Navalny’s 
primary argument is that Putin spends too much on the country’s ex-
ternal affairs whereas Russian economy is in serious need of invest-
ments. This “excessive expenditure” argument pertains both to direct 
war expenses on the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria71 and provision of 
material aid to other states: regarding the letter, Navalny recently crit-
icised Putin for the fact that since 2005, the Russian government has 
cancelled debts owed by Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Cuba, North 
Korea, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Venezuela.72 Notably, Navalny 
tends to specially highlight the fact that it is the money of Russian tax-
payers that the government spends abroad in lieu of allocating them 
for domestic economy, many spheres of which remain backward. To 
exemplify, at one meeting with his constituencies, criticising Putin’s 
decision to spend 100 billion roubles on the gasification of Kyrgyzstan, 
while 40% of the territory of Russia itself is allegedly not gasified, Na-
valny said that his “foreign policy credo” as President would be that he 
would stop writing debts off.73 In his own words, when campaigning in 
Russian provincial towns, he usually formulates his argument in the 
following fashion:
OK great, so Putin is promising to rebuild Palmyra, but why 
don’t you look at the roads in your city? What do you think the 
priority should be? Fixing the roads in Voronezh or Stavropol 
or rebuilding Palmyra? The Americans are loaded. Let them fix 
Palmyra, and we should concentrate on our own problems.74
Furthermore, Navalny considers Putin’s foreign policy to be harm-
ing the country’s society and exacerbating security concerns. Along 
this line, he criticises Putin’s policies in the post-Soviet space for they 
have arguably led to an “uncontrolled inflow of labour migrants” which 
“negatively affects both the unqualified labour market and the general 
state of society that is not able to integrate the migrants at the same 
rate as the increase in their number.”75 Supportive of the general idea 
of Russia’s participation in the Syrian civil war, Navalny still conceives 
of Putin’s policies in Syria as incapable of accounting for the interests 
of Russian Muslims. In his own words, “[i]t is absurd that we [Rus-
sians] are intervening on the side of the Shiites in a war between Sun-
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nis and Shiites even though almost all Russian Muslims are Sunnis”:76 
as a result, “people from the North Caucasus go to Syria in droves to 
fight along their Sunni brothers against Shi’a.”77 In Navalny’s opinion, 
in place of endeavouring “to save Assad, who represents a military jun-
ta,”78 “Russia should join the international coalition against Islamic 
State.”79
Another point in Navalny’s criticism is that Putin arguably fails to use 
available foreign resources to the advantage of Russia’s socioeconom-
ic advancement. One of such resources is the global Russian diaspora 
whose skills and competences, according to Navalny, could be poten-
tially utilised for the furtherance of Russia’s image abroad as well as the 
country’s domestic development, but such is not being done arguably 
because Russians residing abroad perceive their historical homeland as 
hostile to them.80 Another resource of this sort is the experience and 
expertise of the world’s developed states which, in Navalny’s opinion, 
Russia fails to use for its own domestic reforms because Putin’s interna-
tional policies have ruined Russia’s relations with those states.81
Finally, one more line of criticism refers to the fact that Putin’s poli-
cies have arguably weakened the country’s international position. In this 
respect, Navalny states that, similarly to domestic politics, in his foreign 
affairs Putin tends to disregard the established rules and his own prom-
ises. One instance of this point is the Minsk Accords which Putin has 
signed, but never respected,82 another—the Crimean referendum that, 
according to Navalny, was falsified and thus hardly represented the true 
opinion of Crimean people, which he considers among the reasons why 
the international community has not recognised it.83 In addition, Naval-
ny accuses Putin of transforming Ukraine, Russia’s neighbour and Eu-
rope’s largest state, from Russia’s brotherly nation and important part-
ner into a state hostile to Russia.84 Besides, Navalny regards corruption 
and poverty, peculiar to Putin’s regime, to conduce to Russia not being 
respected internationally, believing that “in the modern world, a country 
is respected if its citizens live freely and in affluence.”85
The above-mentioned discussion, however, should not give an im-
pression that Navalny criticises Putin’s all foreign policy moves. Rath-
er, he relates to him only those with which he disagrees. Illustrative of 
this point is, for instance, Russia’s accession to WTO, which Navalny 
welcomes, deeming it as advantageous to multiple sectors of the coun-
try’s economy, however, he does not explicitly link it to Putin.86
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Discussion
Now that the review of Navalny’s standpoints on key foreign policy 
issues has been done, it is possible to speculate on his likely foreign 
policy foundations, drawing relevant parallels and implications. The 
first noteworthy point is that as far as his foreign policy is concerned, 
Putin is generally notorious for prioritising geopolitical competition 
over Russia’s economic development: as Blank notes, “its roots are not 
in economics but in geopolitics and... Putin’s program is fundamen-
tally geopolitical in its thrust, not economic.”87 Therefore, it comes as 
no surprise that the official discourse of the Putin regime accentuates 
international issues more than domestic ones, for it is foreign affairs 
that are used for national identity construction.88 By contrast, Navalny 
clearly treats foreign policy as a side issue, as a derivative of domestic 
policies, viewing it in the first place as a source that may contribute to 
the country’s modernisation. Given Navalny’s “Russia first” standpoint 
and his tough stance on migration, the far-left criticism that equates 
him with Trump89 does not appear very far away from reality, though 
Navalny himself may not be completely agree with such a parallel. Im-
portantly, the fact that he attaches little importance to foreign policy 
is, in a sense, one of the pillars of Navalny’s presidential campaign: to 
exemplify, in a recent interview, he said, “[I]n my electoral campaign, 
I distinguish an important task, that is, to divert the focus of political 
discussion toward domestic policies.”90
As a consequence of this, as was shown above, Navalny does not 
appear to have as clear and detailed a program on foreign policy as the 
one he has, for instance, on corruption. He tends to be ambiguous and 
evasive whenever encountering questions on foreign affairs—in stark 
contrast with his detailed knowledge on domestic issues. It would even 
not be an overstatement to argue that Navalny somewhat does not ap-
pear to be interested in and familiar with foreign policy topics: to illus-
trate, in one interview, he called the problems of Donbas and Crimea 
“not related to each other”;91 another time, when listing the countries 
whose debts Putin has written off,92 Navalny made no difference be-
tween dictatorships amicable to the Putin regime (e.g. Syria, Venezuela) 
and simply developing countries (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan), though this dif-
ference seems to be of crucial significance in this case. In view of that, 
it does not appear surprising that Navalny’s foreign policy views con-
tain a number of contradictions, the origin of which Laruelle foresaw 
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as early as in 2013, linking them to Navalny’s desire to combine hardly 
reconcilable liberalism and nationalism.93 To name a few, he wants to 
participate in the Syrian war as a part of the international coalition 
while spending no money on the country’s restoration; he is willing 
to continue the Eurasian integration as long as it is beneficial for Rus-
sia simultaneously championing the idea to impose a visa regime with 
Central Asian states and finally, he intends to establish friendly rela-
tions with the West without giving Crimea back to Ukraine.
Notably, it is hardly fair to regard Navalny as fully “liberal” when 
it comes to foreign policy issues - although, to borrow the terms of 
IR theory, he may be justly deemed as “neoliberal” in the sense that 
he directly prioritises absolute gains (Russia’s economic development) 
over relative gains (geopolitical competition).94 Nevertheless, the fact 
that he considers Russia’s internal development to be the highest pri-
ority signifies not only that he would give up sponsoring the world’s 
dictatorships—the other side of the coin are his suggestion significant-
ly toughening laws on migration and his immediate rejection to pro-
vide developmental aid to poor states, both of which have little to do 
with liberal values. What is more, as against Putin, Navalny appears 
to attribute great importance to the respect of international norms, 
yet this respect seems to be important not for him per se, due to moral 
principles, but simply for practical reasons, because adherence to rules 
and norms eventually produces a country’s reputation of a predictable 
and responsible actor in the international system, which is eventually 
conducive to its stable economic development. In light of this fact, it is 
small wonder that his criticism of Putin’s policies in Syria and Ukraine 
focuses on the high cost of the wars rather than ethical concerns. To 
understand how such mindset could eventually translate into a real 
foreign policy, let it suffice to say that it bears a close resemblance with 
the current official Serbian discourse about the foreign policy of the 
country’s dictator Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s. As one study notes,
[t]he predominant political narrative in post-Milosevic Serbia 
rejected Milosevic’s wartime strategies as wrong and destruc-
tive; not because they caused great suffering and mass casual-
ties in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but because they econom-
ically, politically, and diplomatically devastated Serbia and 
denied it aspirations to regional domination. In other words, 
Milosevic was not wrong to fight the wars; he was wrong to 
lose them.95
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For the West, Navalny’s pragmatism on foreign policy on the one 
hand means that he would reject Putin’s blatant anti-Westernism and 
thus, Russia would finally heed the world community’s opinion on 
human rights, annulling the recently adopted domestic laws that vio-
late European standards (e.g. the so-called Dima Yakovlev law, the gay 
propaganda law, the law on the priority of the national Constitution 
over the resolutions of the European Court of Human Rights, etc.). 
Otherwise stated, under Navalny, foreign leaders would likely find it 
easier to influence the Russian government’s decisions by raising their 
concerns—which is nearly impossible under Putin who traditionally 
views conceding as expressing a weakness, which he fears arguably due 
to narcissism and bullyism, intrinsic in his personal psychology.96 Yet, 
similarly to contemporary Serbia, Navalny’s Russia would likely expe-
rience significant problems related to European identity construction 
while—at first glance smoothly and successfully—drifting westward 
and complying—often unwillingly and reluctantly—with internation-
al demands and norms.97 For post-Soviet states, the fact that Navalny 
would treat Eurasian integration simply from the viewpoint of eco-
nomic profitability and not geopolitics means that Russia would finally 
stop trying to politicise the integration process and forcibly push other 
states into the Eurasian Economic Union, like Putin did with Arme-
nia and Kyrgyzstan.98 All in all, Navalny would probably bring Russia 
closer to Europe and the West, but he would hardly turn the country’s 
foreign policy by 180 degrees, as far as seeking integration into NATO 
and the EU. In fact, the conclusion made by Katz as early as in 2012 in 
his article entitled “What Would a Democratic Russian Foreign Policy 
Look Like?” seemingly holds for Russia’s possible foreign policy under 
Navalny’s presidency:
[A] democratic Russia will more or less work together with 
America and other Western governments more than the Pu-
tin/Medvedev leadership does now, but differences among 
them on various issues will continue [...] [M]any of the cur-
rent differences between the Western democracies, on the one 
hand, and the Putin/Medvedev administration, on the other, 
are likely to remain after a democratic transformation in Rus-
sia [...] Any Western expectations that a democratic Russia is 
likely to lead to a more pliable Russian foreign policy that will 
follow the US and/or European Union lead are likely to be dis-
appointed.99
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A question that arises is whether Navalny’s views on foreign affairs 
may substantially change should he come to power. Indeed, research 
shows that after winning elections, candidates often embark on poli-
cies that are at odds with their electoral promises—either because they 
realise the impossibility of implementing their plans once they have 
taken office, or because they blatantly lied when campaigning, popu-
listically trying to gain votes.100 Neither of these, nonetheless, seems to 
fully correspond to Navalny’s case. The former is unlikely, given that 
much in his plans (e.g. his intentions regarding Crimea) reflects a clear 
attempt to balance between liberals’ and conservatives’ foreign policy 
expectations and nothing is his program appears wittingly unrealisable 
(e.g. he does not promise to accede to the EU in five years or the like). 
Moreover, his foreign policy plans will be most probably welcomed 
both by Western leaders, tired of Putin’s intractability. With regard to 
the latter, indeed, on the one hand, Navalny’s program rests on “safe” 
ideas, ones that are both critical of the incumbent government and 
likely to gain popular support. In this category fall not only corruption 
and embezzlement, but even his call to redirect the government’s at-
tention from geopolitical toward domestic issues, for it corresponds to 
Russians’ growing fatigue of the primacy of international issues in the 
government’s policies and their dominance in the official discourse.101 
At the same time, there is little doubt that Navalny believes in most 
statements he makes, given that his current arguments—primary focus 
on corruption, the “Russia first” stance, the call to introduce visas with 
Central Asia, etc.—by and large coincide with what he used to say and 
do before he got presidential ambitions. Moreover, regarding him to be 
a blatant populist appears inaccurate also because some of his ideas are 
not only diverse from, but somewhat opposite to predominant public 
attitudes. The examples of such include not only his above-mentioned 
support of gay rights, but also his position on Crimea the annexation of 
which, as recent polls show, is overwhelmingly favoured by Russians.102
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